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Election Juice

Does the incumbent party juice the markets and economy in year 4 of their term, the election year itself? Across 23 terms since Coolidge, the honest answer: the average bump is small, the variance is large, and the data cannot distinguish the sample from noise.

Last updated November 06, 2026

 

Is there a market bump in the election year?

Folklore says the incumbent party manages policy to juice the economy and markets in the election year itself. The data weighs in across 23 presidential terms from Coolidge (1928) to Biden (2024).

SPX juice (avg)
+1.69pp
Year 4 return minus Y1-3 avg, n=23
Unemployment juice (avg)
+0.70pp
Year 4 delta minus Y1-3 delta, n=17
Fed Funds juice (avg)
+0.21pp
Year 4 rate delta minus Y1-3, n=15
SPX year-4 wins
57%
of 23 election years beat the baseline

Statistical significance (paired t-test, two-sided):

  • SPX juice: p=1.000 — noise (t = +0.47)
  • UE juice: p=0.328 — noise (t = +1.39)
  • FF juice: p=1.000 — noise (t = +0.19)

The small positive SPX juice (+1.69pp average) sounds supportive — but p = 1.000 means it is indistinguishable from random noise. In 23 elections, year-4 beats the year-1-through-3 baseline just 57% of the time — barely better than a coin flip. The folklore is mostly folklore.

The 23 terms — juice per series

Each row is one presidential term (end-year labeled). The “juice” column shows the year-4 outcome minus the year-1-through-3 average, so positive = better in the election year than the baseline. Color convention: green = pro-incumbent direction, red = anti-incumbent. UE: negative = unemployment fell more in year 4 than the baseline. FF: direction is context-dependent (loose policy helps asset prices, tight policy fights inflation).

Year Incumbent Party SPX juice UE juice FF juice
1929 Calvin Coolidge R +45.37pp — —
1933 Herbert Hoover R -2.99pp — —
1937 Franklin D. Roosevelt I D +5.78pp — —
1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt II D -1.00pp — —
1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt III D +8.59pp — —
1949 Harry S. Truman I D +5.36pp — —
1953 Harry S. Truman II D -9.55pp +1.10pp —
1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower I R -14.54pp -1.30pp —
1961 Dwight D. Eisenhower II R -4.00pp +1.20pp -2.40pp
1969 Lyndon B. Johnson II D +5.40pp +0.90pp +1.17pp
1973 Richard M. Nixon I R +13.97pp -3.00pp +6.59pp
1981 Jimmy Carter D +14.58pp +2.40pp -7.65pp
1985 Ronald Reagan I R -3.84pp -1.00pp +5.25pp
1989 Ronald Reagan II R +6.37pp +1.00pp +4.70pp
1993 George H.W. Bush R -7.88pp -2.50pp +4.27pp
1997 Bill Clinton I D +14.46pp +1.30pp -2.22pp
2001 Bill Clinton II D -29.74pp +1.20pp -0.78pp
2005 George W. Bush I R +7.53pp -1.60pp +5.97pp
2009 George W. Bush II R -42.35pp +3.90pp -3.24pp
2013 Barack Obama I D -4.75pp -0.60pp +0.17pp
2017 Barack Obama II D +13.76pp +2.50pp +0.05pp
2021 Donald J. Trump I R +2.51pp +3.80pp -2.42pp
2025 Joseph R. Biden D +15.74pp +2.60pp -6.25pp

The six biggest juice outliers

Where the averages come from: a handful of extreme years dominate the distribution. Two of the top three (2008 GFC, 2000 dot-com) are negative — election-year markets collapsed under external shocks, dragging down the aggregate.

Year Incumbent SPX Y1-3 avg SPX Y4 Juice
1929 Calvin Coolidge -0.11pp +45.26pp +45.37pp
2009 George W. Bush II +3.69pp -38.66pp -42.35pp
2001 Bill Clinton II +22.88pp -6.86pp -29.74pp
2025 Joseph R. Biden +7.98pp +23.72pp +15.74pp
1981 Jimmy Carter +2.87pp +17.45pp +14.58pp
1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower I +18.11pp +3.57pp -14.54pp

Does the juice depend on the incumbent’s party?

A quick split by party of the sitting president. Across the 23-term sample, neither party shows a reliable election-year SPX edge over its own 1-3 baseline. The variance within each party group is larger than the gap between them.

Democratic incumbent — SPX juice
+3.22pp
n=12 · 67% positive
Republican incumbent — SPX juice
+0.01pp
n=11 · 45% positive

Methodology

The juice calculation. For each presidential term, compute:

  • y1-3 baseline: average of years 1, 2, and 3 outcomes for the series (SPX return, unemployment delta, Fed Funds rate delta).
  • y4 outcome: year-4 (election year) value for the same series.
  • Juice: y4 minus y1-3 baseline. Positive = election year outperformed the baseline.

Statistical test. Paired two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis that mean juice equals zero. A p-value below 0.05 would reject the null (the juice is real); above 0.10 means the data cannot distinguish the sample mean from random noise.

Sign conventions.

  • SPX juice: positive = election year had higher return. Clearly pro-incumbent (markets like incumbent survival).
  • UE juice: positive = unemployment rose more than baseline. Anti-incumbent. Negative = unemployment fell = pro-incumbent.
  • FF juice: positive = Fed hiked more in election year. Direction is contextual — tight policy helps dollar + fights inflation but hurts equities.

Data sources.

  • SPX annual returns: symbol_data.db daily closes, computed start-of-year to end-of-year.
  • Unemployment rate: FRED UNRATE, Dec year-1 to Dec year-end delta.
  • Fed Funds target: FRED DFEDTARU, same window.

Caveats.

  • Sample size (23) is small for a hypothesis test. A real effect of +5pp or more would likely still fail to clear p=0.05 at this n.
  • The baseline is averaged across just 3 years, which is noisy. A rolling 5-year or 10-year baseline would tighten the test.
  • External shocks (2008 GFC, 2000 dot-com, 1929 crash) land in election years randomly. They inflate variance without signaling policy intent.

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